Something just dawned on me while working on the opening paragraphs in Part III of “Strategic Accounting and Allocation of the Federal Budget.” The idea pertains to the conduct of Financial Warfare and that it can only be practically applied by Socialist nations under the Work-Standard. It is so amazing that no nation, not even the Liberal Capitalist ones, will ever misunderstand what I am even talking about. A Socialistic mindset is needed.

Here’s a description I found about Speculative Attacks for those unfamiliar with the inner-workings of FOREX (Foreign Exchange):

“What is a speculative attack?”

A speculative attack occurs in the foreign exchange markets when speculators attack the currency of a country attempting to maintain a fixed, or pegged exchange rate. If the country does not hold enough foreign currency reserves to buy enough of its domestic currency, the attack can result in the peg failing.

“Where have you heard about a speculative attack?”

The best known speculative attack, and one of the most famous trades of all time, was George Soros’ attack on the British pound in 1992 where he sold at least $1.5 billion of the U.K. currency. This resulted in ‘Black Wednesday’, when the British government withdrew from the Exchange Rate Mechanism.

“What you need to know about a speculative attack?”

Speculative attacks do not always succeed. Soros’ trade was successful because the Bank of England’s attempts to prop up the pound failed, even though it bought ‎£1 billion worth of its own currency within two hours of the market opening on Black Wednesday. It raised interest rates to make the pound more attractive, but this failed too. In contrast, when a huge attack took place against the Hong Kong dollar in 1997, the combination of the ability to source large amounts of currency from China and interest rates that hit 50 per cent meant the central bank successfully defended itself.

Should financial speculators, especially Individuals who profit from FOREX (Foreign Exchange), be considered potential war criminals by conducting Financial Warfare against any Currency pegged to the Work-Standard? Should they be tried at the Hague in the Netherlands for committing financial war crimes against the Totality of a Socialist nation?

Under the Work-Standard, Command Responsibility is always the rule when dealing with large sums of Geld, particularly whenever one is converting the domestic currency to a foreign currency. The person is responsible for issuing the command. Yes, there would be accidental cases, but when somebody like George Soros decides to make a whole fortune by harming the Totality of any nation with Speculative Attacks directed at their Currency, that is where I must draw the line.

The International Committee of the Red Cross states the following about Command Responsibility under the Intents of Command and Obedience:

This rule has been interpreted in case-law following the Second World War and also in the case-law of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. This includes, but is not limited to, the following points:

(i) Civilian command authority. Not only military personnel but also civilians can be liable for war crimes on the basis of command responsibility. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in the Akayesu case in 1998 and in the Kayishema and Ruzindana case in 1999, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in the Delalić case in 1998, have adopted this principle. It is also contained in the Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and of the Special Court for Sierra Leone refer in general terms to a “superior,” as do many military manuals and national legislation.

(ii) Commander/subordinate relationship. The relationship between the commander and the subordinate does not necessarily need to be a direct de jure one. De facto command responsibility is sufficient to occasion liability of the commander. This principle is recognized in various judgments of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. The Tribunals identified the actual possession of control over the actions of subordinates, in the sense of material ability to prevent and punish the commission of crimes, as the crucial criterion. The same idea is reflected in Article 28 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

(iii) The commander/superior knew, or had reason to know. Practice confirms that command responsibility is not limited to situations where the commander/superior has actual knowledge of the crimes committed or about to be committed by his or her subordinates, but that constructive knowledge is sufficient. The latter idea is expressed in various sources with slightly different formulations: “had reason to know”, “had information which should have enabled [the commander/superior] to conclude in the circumstances at the time”, the commander/superior “(owing to the circumstances at the time,) should have known”, the commander/superior was “at fault in having failed to acquire such knowledge”, and the commander/superior was “criminally negligent in failing to know”. These formulations essentially cover the concept of constructive knowledge.

The International Committee of the Red Cross states the following about war crimes:

Practice provides further specifications with respect to the nature of the conduct constituting a war crime, its perpetrators and their mental state.

(i) Acts or omissions. War crimes can consist of acts or omissions. Examples of the latter include failure to provide a fair trial and failure to provide food or necessary medical care to persons in the power of the adversary. Unlike crimes against humanity, which consist of a “widespread or systematic” commission of prohibited acts, any serious violation of international humanitarian law constitutes a war crime. This is clear from extensive and consistent case-law from the First World War until the present day.

(ii) Perpetrators. Practice in the form of legislation, military manuals and case-law shows that war crimes are violations committed either by members of the armed forces or by civilians against members of the armed forces, civilians or protected objects of the adverse party. National legislation typically does not limit the commission of war crimes to members of the armed forces, but rather indicates the acts that are criminal when committed by any person. Several military manuals contain the same approach. A number of military manuals, as well as some legislation, expressly include the term “civilians” among the persons that can commit war crimes.

(iii) Mental element. International case-law has indicated that war crimes are violations that are committed wilfully, i.e., either intentionally (dolus directus) or recklessly (dolus eventualis). The exact mental element varies depending on the crime concerned.

War crimes include the following serious violations of international humanitarian law:

(i) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions:

In the case of an international armed conflict, any of the following acts committed against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:

willful killing;

torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;

willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;

extensive destruction or appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;

compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power;

willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of a fair and regular trial;

unlawful deportation or transfer;

unlawful confinement;

taking of hostages.

This list of grave breaches was included in the Geneva Conventions largely on the basis of crimes pursued after the Second World War by the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and at Tokyo and by national courts. The list is repeated in the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and of the International Criminal Court. It is also reflected in the legislation of many States. The understanding that such violations are war crimes is uncontroversial.

(ii) Other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed during an international armed conflict:

committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating or degrading treatment and desecration of the dead;

enforced sterilization;

compelling the nationals of the adverse party to take part in military operations against their own party;

killing or wounding a combatant who has surrendered or is otherwise hors de combat;

declaring that no quarter will be given;

making improper use of distinctive emblems indicating protected status, resulting in death or serious personal injury;

making improper use of the flag, the military insignia or uniform of the enemy resulting in death or serious personal injury;

killing or wounding an adversary by resort to perfidy;

making medical or religious personnel, medical units or medical transports the object of attack;

pillage or other taking of property contrary to international humanitarian law;

destroying property not required by military necessity.

These violations were the subject of war crimes trials after the Second World War. They are also included in the Statute of the International Criminal Court or, if not replicated in exactly the same terms, are in effect covered, as evidenced by the Elements of Crimes for the International Criminal Court. The war crime “making medical or religious personnel, medical units or medical transports the object of attack” covers aspects of the war crime contained in Article 8(2)(b)(ix) and (xxiv) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. The identification of these violations as war crimes in the Statute of the International Criminal Court was not controversial. Attacking persons hors de combat and the perfidious use of protective emblems or signs are listed in Additional Protocol I as grave breaches. There is also practice which extends the scope of this war crime to the perfidious use of protective signals.

Under the Work-Standard, medical personnel such as doctors and nurses and ecclesiastical personnel like clergy or religious will become potential military targets for financial speculators engaging in Speculative Attacks. Any financial speculator who profits from a Speculative Attack against the Currency of any Socialist nation deserves to be tried at the Hague for potential war crimes during the conduct of Financial Warfare.  

Categories: Compendium

Tags: Economics, Finance, Financial Warfare, George Soros, Military Science, Military-Industrial Complex, Politics, Psychology, Socialist Finance, Speculative Attacks, Work-Standard, Worldview Warfare